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School Access, Resources, and Learning Outcomes: 
Evidence from a Non-formal School Program in Bangladesh
* 
 
This study reports evidence from an unusual policy intervention – The Reaching Out of 
School Children (ROSC) project – in Bangladesh where school grants and education 
allowances are offered to attract hard-to-reach children to schools comprised of a single 
teacher and a classroom. The operating unit cost of these schools is a fraction of that of 
formal primary schools. We use panel data to investigate whether ROSC schools are 
effective in raising enrolment and learning outcomes. Our findings suggest that there is a 
modest impact on school participation: ROSC schools increase enrolment probability 
between 9 and 18% for children in the two age cohorts 6-8 and 6-10. They perform as well as 
non-ROSC schools in terms of raising test scores, and even have positive impacts on 
academically stronger students. There is also strong evidence of positive externalities on 
non-ROSC schools in program areas. These results point to the effectiveness of a new 
model of non-formal primary schools that can be replicated in similar settings. 
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I. Introduction 
Despite  their  seemingly  indispensable  roles  in  promoting  student  educational 
outcomes, there have been mixed results on the impacts of school supply and resources on 
access and learning outcomes (Hanushek, 2006). Findings from recent rigorous impact 
evaluation studies suggest that this is particularly the case for developing countries. On 
one hand, providing educational inputs such as textbooks (Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin, 
2009), flip charts (Glewwe et al., 2004), and reduced teacher-pupil ratios (Duflo, Dupas, 
and Kremer, 2010) were generally found to have either no or very limited impacts on 
student test scores. On the other hand, other inputs such as remedial education programs 
(Banerjee  et  al.,  2007),  extra  after-school  classes  (Banerjee  et  al.,  2010),  free  school 
uniform (Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia, 2008), and reduced student fees and scholarship 
(Kremer, Miguel, and Thorton, 2009) were found to increase student reading skills and 
test scores and/ or decrease drop-out rates. Even the building of new schools does not 
always lead to large gains in school enrolment rates (Filmer, 2007). It appears that no 
consensus  has  been  reached  on  the  best  school  (policy)  interventions  to  expand 
educational opportunities in developing countries.
1  
Even in  the  case  such  a consensus exists, providing  more  inputs into  the  existing 
systems may not bring the best outcomes. Institutional issues with educational systems in 
developing  countries  such  as  corruption,  lack  of  transparency,  and  inefficient  use  of 
resources may severely impair the effectiveness of increased school resources (Glewwe 
and Kremer, 2006). In response to these problems, an alternative schooling model has 
                                                 
1 There is conflicting evidence as well about other school supply interventions such as teacher performance 
pay, which is found to have positive impacts on test scores in India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2009) 
but no or limited impacts in Kenya (Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2010). See also Glewwe and Kremer (2006) 
and Kremer and Holla (2009) for more general review of the literature on the impacts of school inputs, and 
Dang and Rogers (2008) for a review on the impacts of extra tutoring classes.  2 
 
been introduced: the non-formal schooling system. Starting in the late 1970s with the 
Escuela Nueva (New School) program in rural Colombia (Psacharopolous, Rojas, and 
Velez,  1993;  McEwan,  1998),  the  non-formal  schooling  movement  is  gaining  more 
popularity and has spread to many developing countries including the BRAC (Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee) primary school program in Bangladesh in the mid-1980s 
(Chabbot, 2006), the Community School program in Egypt in the early 1990s (Farrell, 
2004), and the School for Life program in Ghana in the late 1990s (Hartwell, 2006).  
In spite of their different names, these programs appear to share at least three common 
characteristics:  they  are  usually  operated by non-state  providers  (in  particular,  NGOs) 
with strong community participation, they have low operational costs, and they cater to 
vulnerable and hard-to-reach students who were excluded for various reasons from the 
formal education system.
2  It is notable that these programs are currently  spreading to 
urban  areas,  post-primary  schooling  levels,  and  formal  public  schools  as  well.  The 
Reaching  Out-Of-School  Children  (ROSC)  program  we  evaluate  in  this  paper  is  a 
particular example where, inspired by the ‘success’ of the BRAC model,
3 the Government 
of Bangladesh brought this model into the formal schooling system and expanded it on a 
large scale. Since 2005, ROSC has provided more than 15,000 schools (learning centers) 
serving  over  500,000  educationally  disadvantaged  children  in  the  poorest 60  Upazilas 
                                                 
2 See Farrell and Hartwell (2008) and Ahmed (2008) for two recent (and qualitative) reviews of non-formal 
school programs.  
3 A BRAC school is a school consisting of one teacher and one classroom that caters to out-of-school (and 
usually  marginalized)  children  which  is  operated  by  the  NGO  BRAC.  Although  BRAC  schools  and 
government public schools teach the same the same competency-based curriculum, Chabbott (2006) points 
out three key operational differences between these schools: i) student intake occurs every four years at the 
former but annually at the latter, ii) the average class size is 25 to 33 students at the former, but around twice 
higher at 61 students at the latter, and iii) while the former averages 4,091 contact hours per primary cycle, 
the corresponding figure at the latter is lower at 4,046. At the same time, BRAC schools have higher 
attendance rates (96 percent) and completion rates (94 percent) than government public schools (61 and 67 
percent respectively), and BRAC students have higher test scores across several different subjects including 
life skills, reading, writing, and numeracy. Chabbott also estimates the cost per BRAC school completer is 
$84, around one third that of $246 for government public school. 3 
 
(sub-districts)  in  Bangladesh.  The  program  is  currently  being  expanded  to  include  30 
additional Upazilas. 
While these non-formal education programs have reached tens of thousands of schools 
and millions of students all over the world, there are very few studies that rigorously 
evaluate their impacts on enrolment and learning outcomes. Furthermore, the existing few 
studies  provide  mixed  results.  The  most  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  relative 
performance of BRAC schools in Bangladesh finds that non-formal schools in Bangladesh 
are  effective  in  raising  female  enrolment  and  test  scores  in  rural  areas  (Sukontamarn, 
2006).  In  the  absence  of  panel  data,  Sukontamarn  relies  on  cross-sectional  data  and 
combines information on child year of birth and year of BRAC school establishment in 
the village to compare the impacts of BRAC schools on enrolment across the exposed and 
unexposed  birth  cohorts.  For  test  scores,  she  estimates  the  cross-section  relationship 
between  student  performance  and  different  types  of  schools,  assuming  that  school 
selection  bias  can  be  reduced  by  controlling  for  student,  family,  and  village 
characteristics. However, alternative evidence based on performance of secondary school 
students does not support the view that BRAC graduates enjoy a learning advantage over 
their peers educated in other school types (Asadullah, Chaudhury and Dar, 2007).  
There is equally a lack of consensus on the impacts of non-formal schools for other 
developing countries. For instance, Arif and Saqib (2003) find no gap between public and 
NGO schools in terms of test scores for grade 4 students enrolled in 50 public, private, 
and NGO schools located across six districts in Pakistan; but another study also analyzes 
data  from  Pakistan  and  arrives  at  the  opposite  conclusion  that  non-governmental 
organization schools are more effective than government or private schools (Khan and 4 
 
Kiefer, 2007). Similar to the previous studies on Bangladesh, both these studies use cross-
sectional data for analysis and may thus suffer in varying degrees from estimation issues 
with school selection bias.
4 Thus it remains unclear if the true causal impacts of non-
formal schools have been correctly identified.
5   
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of ROSC schools on both school enrolment 
and test scores using rich panel data from household and school surveys and censuses in 
Bangladesh. Our contributions are threefold. First, ROSC is a large scale program that 
serves the most educationally disadvantaged children in Bangladesh. Understanding the 
program  impacts  on  educational  outcomes  would  be  important  in  itself  for  the 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and international donors in the cause of raising school 
enrolment and learning quality. Faced with a variety of intervention options but perhaps 
scanty rigorous impact evaluation evidence at the same time, policy makers could always 
use new results from impact evaluation studies such as ours.  
Second, to our knowledge, our study is the first to evaluate the impacts of a large-scale 
government-financed non-formal school program on school enrolment and test scores. We 
do  not  know  of  any  previous  rigorous  evaluation  of  a  non-formal  program  that  is 
mainstreamed  into  the  formal  primary  education  system.  Our  findings  have  much 
                                                 
4 Only the two studies by Asadullah, Chaudhury, and Dar (2007) and Khan and Kiefer (2007) address 
school  endogeneity  issues  with  instrumental  variables.  However,  the  findings  in  these  two  studies  are 
limited by the nature of the cross-sectional data they use. The former combines fixed-effects specifications 
and intimate knowledge about school supply in Bangladesh to tease out selection bias into secondary school, 
but does not address previous selection bias into primary school. The instruments in the latter consist of 
number of siblings, parental education, and household wealth, and are not likely to satisfy the exclusion 
restrictions. For example, parental education can directly affect student test scores through parental help 
with  homework  and  better  genetic  endowments  for  children  (i.e.  student  innate  ability).  Similarly,  the 
number  of  siblings  and  household  wealth  can  affect  test  scores  respectively  through  the  well-known 
quantity-quality tradeoff regime (see, for example, Becker and Lewis, 1973) and availability of learning 
materials such as textbooks and computers which are conducive to better school performance. 
5 In this paper we focus on the impacts of non-formal schools on school enrolment and test scores. See, for 
example, Sud (2010) for the impacts of non-formal schools on transition into post-primary education (who 
also relies on a cross-section of households for analysis).  5 
 
relevance  for other  countries  that plan  to adopt  and/ or  expand  this  schooling  model, 
especially given the rising popularity of non-formal schools and the fact that our study 
country is Bangladesh—which has one of the oldest and most widespread non-formal 
school programs in the developing world. In addition, this non-formal school program has 
even more policy relevance since it also includes a demand-side component that provides 
stipends to students conditional on their school enrolment and performance.  
Finally, the rich individual-level panel data that we collected allows us to provide 
more  rigorous  estimates  in  at  least  two  major  aspects.  Firstly,  we  use  a  child  effects 
model,  which  is  at  a  disaggregated  and  more  refined  level  than  the  usual  school-  or 
village- effects model employed by most previous studies. Together with standard errors 
for estimation results being clustered at the child level, this would control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in identifying the causal impacts of ROSC schools. Secondly, we 
use a (multiple) treatment/control model to evaluate the ROSC schools’ effects on both 
schooling  quantity  (i.e.,  enrolment)  and  quality  (i.e.,  standardized  test  scores),  which 
should represent a good picture of its impacts.  
We  find  that  ROSC  schools  increase  enrolment  probability  by  between  9  and  18 
percent for children in the age cohorts 6- 8 and 6-10, and perform as well as non-ROSC 
schools  in  terms  of  raising  test  scores.  In  particular,  academically  stronger  students 
attending ROSC schools improve their test scores by around 0.2- 0.4 standard deviations 
compared to their peers at other schools. There is also strong evidence that ROSC schools 
bring about positive externalities on non-ROSC schools in program areas.  
This paper consists of seven sections. The context for the country and the program 
description is provided in Section II, and the data is described in Section III. The impacts 6 
 
of the ROSC project on education outcomes as measured by student enrolment and test 
scores are discussed in Section IV and other program effects are considered in Section V, 
with the empirical estimation frameworks being respectively detailed in each Section. The 
relative efficiency of ROSC schools versus non-ROSC schools is discussed in Section VI 
and Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Country Background and Program Description 
II.1. Country Background 
Bangladesh  has  made  significant  progress  in  primary  education  over  the  past  two 
decades.  With nearly 18 million children enrolled in about 80,000 primary schools in the 
country, primary gross enrolment rate exceeds 90% and the net enrolment rate is close to 
70% (our calculations using the 2005 Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditures 
Survey).
6  Gender  parity  in  primary  education  has  also  been  achieved.    Despite  this 
important progress, considerable challenges remain. There is limited access to schooling 
for the poorest and a significant number of school-aged children are still out of school. 
Moreover, the quality of schooling remains weak as reflected in the low levels of learning 
observed (Asadullah, Chaudhury, and Dar, 2007). 
To address these critical issues of low quality of school and inequitable access 
while pursuing the 2015 Education For All (EFA) goals, the Government of Bangladesh 
decided, in 2004, to embark on an innovative experiment to reach out-of-school children. 
A new schooling model (ROSC) akin to non-formal schools of BRAC was developed to 
serve out-of-school children who reside in under-provided areas and belong mostly to 
                                                 
6 Primary enrolment can be further broken down as follows: 76% in public government schools, 11% in 
government-subsidized private schools, 5% in private schools, and the remaining in NGO and Madrassa 
schools (our calculations using the 2005 Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditures Survey). 7 
 
poor  households.  These  new  schools  were  thus  largely  set  up  in  areas  with  limited 
provision of formal schools and have minimum operational costs.  ROSC is a unique and 
innovative model in that it combines both supply and demand side interventions targeted 
towards children aged 7-14 who were left out of the formal primary education system, 
especially those from disadvantaged areas and groups. 
II.2. Program Description 
Sixty Upazilas in Bangladesh were chosen for the ROSC project based on their net 
enrollment rate (NER), primary completion rate, gender parity in enrollment and poverty 
rate. The first selection criterion requires selected Upazilas to have a NER lower than 85 
per cent. Once this screening criterion is satisfied, selected Upazilas must fulfill two out of 
three following selection criteria: (i) the gender gap in enrolment should be greater, at 
least, than 2 percentage points; (ii) the primary completion rate should not exceed 50 per 
cent; and (iii) the poverty rate should be above 30 per cent.  
Two  major  program  interventions  were  designed  for  these  Upazilas:  the  first  is  a 
school-only grant (G intervention) that was implemented in 23 Upazilas and the other is a 
school grant plus an education allowance to students (GA intervention) implemented in 
the remaining 37 Upazilas. The school grant intervention—ranging between Taka 25,000-
31,000 per school for GA schools and 55,000- 65,000 for G schools
7—provides funding 
for the purpose of establishing a new school (hereafter referred to as ROSC schools), 
together with educational materials and supplies, training, teacher salary, sanitation and 
safe  drinking  water,  and  maintenance  and  repairs.  On  the  other  hand,  the  education 
                                                 
7 The exchange rate is around Taka 69 for one US dollar during 2006- 2009 (World Bank, 2011). 8 
 
allowance provides a stipend ranging between Taka 800 and 970 annually for eligible 
(e.g., out-of-school) children to attend school.
8 
The ROSC project is implemented by a ROSC implementation unit at the Department 
of Primary Education, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, which is responsible for 
the overall implementation, monitoring and reporting on the project. However, day-to-day 
management of ROSC schools—including establishment of the school, hiring of teachers, 
education service providers and utilization of the grants—is highly decentralized with a 
number of actors involved in the implementation. ROSC schools are managed and run by 
a Center Management Committee (CMC)
9. We provide in Appendix 1 a more detailed 
comparison of the main characteristics of ROSC schools versus BRAC and GP schools. 
Over the past five years of project implementation, the ROSC project managed to 
enroll and provide education allowances to about half million out-of-school children from 
60 Upazilas, as well as grants to about 15,000 ROSC schools established under a US$ 60 
million investment project. ROSC is also credited with an ingrown monitoring cell with 
good capacity to collect, analyze and report data. However, ROSC monitoring cell lacks 
the capacity to carry out a rigorous evaluation of the project impacts. This study intends to 
fill that analytical gap. 
                                                 
8 In Upazilas which receive education allowances and grants (GA) (i) each child in grade I-III receives Taka 
800  annually  while  each  child  of  grade  IV-V  receive  Taka  970  annually.  To  continue  to  receive  the 
education allowance, a student must maintain minimum pass mark of 40 percent in the annual examination 
and record 80 percent attendance. An annual grant of Taka 25,000-31,000 is provided to the CMCs of 
ROSC schools as discretionary grant for teacher salaries, quality improvements and payment for service 
providers.  For Grants only (G) Upazilas, each ROSC school receives an annual grant of Taka 55,000-
65,000 annually depending on enrollment size to be used for the same discretionary purposes. However, 
students do not receive any education allowances at the ROSC schools in G Upazilas.   
9  A  Center  Management  Committee  is  usually  comprised  of  11  members,  which  include  five 
parents/guardians, a local education officer, a local administrative officer, an NGO representative, the head 
of the local government primary school, a person from the community, and the teacher of the ROSC school. 
This teacher also serves as the CMC secretary. 9 
 
Unlike  regular  government  primary  (GP)  schools  which  generally  have  five 
classrooms  or  more,  ROSC  schools  are organized  around  a  single  teacher  in  a  single 
classroom. This suggests that the unit operating cost of ROSC schools is likely to be lower 
than that of GP schools. We will return to discuss the efficiency of ROSC schools in a 
later section. In the next section, we describe the data for analysis. 
 
III. Data Description 
III.1. Baseline and Follow-up Surveys 
We designed and implemented surveys at the household, school, and village levels to 
measure the impacts of the ROSC program. Both the household and school surveys have 
panel data with baseline and follow-up components. For the baseline survey, 14 Upazilas 
(8 GA Upazilas and 6 G Upazilas) were randomly selected from out of the 60 ROSC 
Upazilas for the treatment, and 6 non-ROSC Upazilas that were considered to have similar 
program eligibility ratings to the ROSC Upazilas (based on the same selection criteria 
above) were selected to form a comparison group.
10  
From each of these 20 Upazilas, 3 unions were randomly selected leading to a sample 
of 60 unions, and one village was randomly selected in each union. Then a random sample 
of 25 households was selected from each village for a detailed household survey, making 
the  total  sample  of  interviewed  households  in  the  baseline  1,500.  Out  of  these  1,500 
households,  800  households  were  randomly  selected  for  re-interview  in  the  follow-up 
survey,
11 and detailed data was collected about children’s school enrolment and household 
                                                 
10 These 6 control Upazilas were randomly selected from a list of 98 non-ROSC Project Upazilas which 
were considered to have similar eligibility ratings as the ROSC Upazilas. More details are provided in 
Ahmed (2006). 
11 The follow-up survey was implemented in 12 Upazilas and 36 unions out of the 20 Upazilas and 60 
unions  of  the  baseline  survey.  A  simple  random  sampling  technique  was  adopted  to  sample  from  the 10 
 
expenditures  from  these  households.  A  short  census  was  also  administered  to  all  the 
households  in  these  sampled  villages  and  provides  data  on  the  village  infrastructure, 
cultivation land areas, living standards (as measured by recent consumption of fish or 
meat), and educational achievement.  
Out of these 60 selected villages, the baseline school survey collected data on 8 ROSC 
schools on average per village and some other primary schools, including government 
primary schools (GPS) and NGO schools.
12 To measure the quality of education in ROSC 
schools and other formal primary schools, the baseline school survey  administered  an 
achievement test to all students who were currently enrolled in Grade 2 in these schools. 
In total, 5,063 Grade 2 students were tested, with the majority of these students (53%) 
enrolled in ROSC schools and the remaining students (46%) mostly enrolled in public 
primary schools.  
Of  these  children,  3,019  children  were  selected  for  re-interview  in  the  follow-up 
survey.
13 Compared to the baseline, a higher percentage of these children (67%) were 
found to be enrolled in ROSC schools but the remaining children were mostly enrolled in 
public primary schools. We could test most children at school; for those who were absent 
                                                                                                                                                   
surveyed baseline Upazilas, resulting in 9 ROSC Upazilas (5 GA Upazilas and 4 G Upazilas) and 3 non-
ROSC Upazilas being covered in follow-up survey. All the 36 unions (e.g., 36 villages) in the baseline 
survey located in these 12 Upazilas were then resurveyed. Unions and villages were respectively the primary 
sampling units (PSU) for the schools and the households. The main reason for this reduction in sample size 
is due to shortage of funding.  
12 For villages with more than 8 ROSC schools, 8 ROSC schools were randomly selected. For villages with 
fewer than 8 ROSC schools, all the ROSC schools in the village were selected and some ROSC schools in 
adjacent villages within the same union were selected to obtain 8 ROSC schools (DATA, March 2010). 
More details on the baseline surveys are provided in Ahmed (2006). A total of 333 ROSC schools, 63 
government  primary  schools  (GPS),  and  104  NGO  schools  in  both  ROSC  and  non-ROSC  areas  were 
surveyed in the baseline school survey. 
13 In fact, 3,885 children took the test in the follow-up survey, but out of these children, 866 were new 
students who were not tested in the baseline survey. Thus we dropped these new children from the sample 
for analysis. 11 
 
from school on the test day we visited and tested them at home.
14 In addition to test 
scores, the school survey also collected data on school infrastructure such as the working 
condition of blackboards, and whether the school has a toilet, alphabetic and numeric 
charts, electricity, and water.   
However,  our  data  suffers  from  several  limitations.  First,  data  on  student 
characteristics were not collected in the baseline school survey (except for student gender 
and grade) and were only collected in the follow-up school survey. Thus while we have 
panel data (i.e., two observations) on student test scores, we only have a cross section of 
data  on  student  characteristics  from  the  follow-up  school  survey.  Second,  there  is  no 
information available to link the households in the baseline household census with those 
in the follow-up household census. Third, while there is some overlapping between the 
household data and the school data for some students, the sample size is too small to allow 
meaningful analysis.  Thus we use the household survey and school survey separately to 
investigate  the  impacts  of  ROSC  schools  on  enrolment  and  learning  achievement 
respectively.  
III.2. Timing of Baseline and Follow-up Surveys and Effective Sample Sizes 
It is important to note that the timing of the baseline survey has a major impact on the 
design of our evaluation study. The baseline survey was implemented from February to 
April 2006; however, by early 2006, most of the ROSC project villages already had a 
ROSC school. Furthermore, given that a large number of ROSC schools were already in 
operation in 2006, data collected in (or after) 2006 is likely to be “contaminated” and not 
likely represents a good baseline.  
                                                 
14 Out of the 3,019 children with both baseline and follow-up test scores, 2,182 children took the test at 
school while 837 students took it at home. Out of these 837 students, around 21% are school drop-outs and 
58% are enrolled in ROSC schools.  12 
 
In  order  to  circumvent  the  problem,  the  household  surveys  asked  retrospective 
questions on enrolment for the three years preceding the surveys and collected data on 
enrolment for the children in these households from 2004 up to 2009. Thus we use data 
from the household surveys to look at the changes in enrolment rates for children before 
and after the introduction of ROSC schools. In other words, since the ROSC project came 
into full operation during 2005 and 2006, enrolment in 2004 can be considered pre-ROSC 
enrolment,  and  enrolment  after  2006  can  be  considered  post-ROSC  enrolment.  After 
dropping all the missing observations, panel data on 955 children in the age range 6 to 14 
in 2004 are available for analysis.  
Since we cannot force children to randomly enroll in ROSC schools or non-ROSC 
schools, we can only measure the changes in test scores over time for children who were 
already enrolled in these schools. These changes would measure the impacts of ROSC 
schools versus non-ROSC schools on the relative gains in student test score performance, 
assuming student (ability as measured by) test scores are comparable in the baseline. We 
will return to discuss this assumption in more detail in the next section. After cleaning the 
data  (such  as  dropping  students  with  missing  household  and  school  characteristics  or 
students with suspicious data on current grade level and some transfer students), we are 
left with a sample of 2,306 students with test scores in both the baseline and follow-up 
surveys that can be analyzed. 
III.3. Summary Statistics 
Summary  statistics  were  provided  in  Table  1  and  Table  2  respectively  for  the 
estimation samples of children age 6- 14 in the panel household surveys and children with 
test scores in both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Children in our estimation sample 13 
 
are equally likely to enroll in school in both G and GA areas compared to non-ROSC 
areas (Table 1). However, it is perhaps not surprising that children living in ROSC areas 
or studying at ROSC schools are at a disadvantage compared to their peers in non-ROSC 
areas (schools) as shown by statistical t-tests.  
Children in ROSC areas are more likely to live in households that have less educated 
members and lower household consumption levels, and are more likely to live in villages 
with  lower  educational  achievement.  Compared  to  children  from  ROSC  areas,  while 
children in G areas live in villages with more cultivable land areas and electrification, 
those in GA areas live in villages with less cultivable land.  
While children at G schools have comparable baseline test scores to those at non-
ROSC schools, children studying in GA schools have much lower baseline test scores 
(Table 2). Compared to their peers at non-ROSC schools, children at ROSC schools are 
somewhat  older,  live  in  poorer  households  with  less  educated  parents,
15  and  study  in 
schools with poorer infrastructures. For example, only 15 percent of ROSC schools have a 
number chart, while the corresponding number for non-ROSC schools is more than three 
times higher at 54 percent, and blackboards at ROSC schools have lower quality than 
those in public schools.
16  
The distribution of standardized test scores for G, GA, and non-ROSC schools are 
shown for 2006 and 2009 in Figure 1.
17 Test scores for G schools have a very similar 
distribution to those for non-ROSC schools for both years, and appear to have the same 
                                                 
15 Note that these differences alone appear to indicate the success for the ROSC project in attracting these 
educationally disadvantaged children to school. 
16 The blackboard variable has four values ranging from 1 to 4 which respectively indicate in this order four 
statuses: unusable, disrepair, good, and very good.  
17 Test scores in 2006 and 2009 are standardized based on the mean and standard deviation from the scores 
for non-ROSC schools in 2006.  14 
 
improvement as those for non-ROSC schools. On the other hand, most of the distribution 
of the test scores for GA schools shifted to the right from 2006 to 2009, indicating that test 
scores at GA schools significantly improved in this period. 
  
IV. Impacts of ROSC Program 
IV.1. Impacts of ROSC Program on School Enrolment  
Empirical Model 
From the preceding discussion on the timing of the ROSC project, it is evident that 
children  in  our  sample  were  subject  to  a  multiple  treatment  design.  Since  the  panel 
household data provide observations on children’s enrolment status for each year from 
2004  to  2008,  we  can  consider  enrolment  rates  in  2004  as  pre-ROSC  outcomes,  and 
enrolment rates from 2006 onwards as post-ROSC outcomes.
18 Since we have data on 
children  enrolment  for  several  years  from  2006  onwards,  each  of  these  years  would 
represent a year where children are “treated” to the ROSC school model.  
While we also have data on children’s enrolment status in 2009, we prefer to restrict 
the data to 2008 only.  The main reason is that the pre-treatment year is 2004, thus by 
2008, children in grade 1 in 2004 must be in grade 5 in 2008 already. Restricting the 
sample to the year 2008 thus helps avoid the downward bias to the program effects caused 
by some children who drop out of school immediately after finishing primary school; 
however, as a robustness check we will also consider the results when the estimation 
sample includes 2009. 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking, the ROSC project covered most but not all villages in 2006, but we can still include the 
year 2006 in the model since we look at the impacts for each separate year.  15 
 
Thus we can use the following multiple treatment model to estimate the impacts of the 













k k ivt Z   Y P   Y P E ε µ η γ δ β α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = = 1 1 1 1
*    (1) 
where the variables are defined as follows 
α : constant term 
ivt E : enrolment status for child i in village v at time t.  ivt E equals 1 if the child is enrolled 
and 0 otherwise.  
k P : program area, with k= 1, 2.  1 P being the Grant (G) areas and  2 P  being the Grant+ 
Allowance (GA) areas. The reference category is the non-ROSC areas. 
t Y : year dummy variable, with t= 2006, 2007, 2008. The reference category is the year 
2004. 
ivt Z : other control variables from the baseline and follow-up household surveys including 
individual, household, and village characteristics.
20 Individual characteristics in equation 
(1)  include  student  gender  and  age.  Household  characteristics  include  the  years  of 
schooling for the most educated household member, household size, and household living 
standards (as measured by log of monthly per capita expenditure).  However, there is no 
expenditure  data  in  2006  thus  we  use  the  expenditure  aggregates  from  2009  instead. 
Village characteristics include the share of households with electricity in the village, the 
                                                 
19 We can also compare enrolments between the baseline and follow-up surveys at the village level instead 
of the children level. However, it is not optimal to do so for at least two reasons. First, there is a limited 
number of observations at the village level (18 observations for a single year or 36 observations for 2006 
and 2009), and second, much precision is lost when data at the household level have to be aggregated up to 
the village level. Thus we do not use the household census data for regression analysis. However, we did run 
some regressions using this data, and there are no statistically significant impacts for ROSC schools. 
20 There are only two observations (from two rounds of household surveys) on each of these variables. Thus 
we use the values in the 2006 survey for the years 2004 and 2006, and the values in the 2009 survey for the 
years 2007 and 2008.  16 
 
average cultivable land area for households in the village, the share of cultivable land 
under irrigation in winter season, village living standards (as measured by the share of 
households in the village that consumed/ purchased fish or meat in the past 7 days), and 
village education levels (as measured by the share of villagers having passed Grade 5 or 
higher).  
  i µ : child (individual) random effects, where  ivt t k i Z Y P , , | µ is assumed to have a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance 
2
µ σ .  
ivt ε : random error term. where  ivt t k ivt Z Y P , , | ε is assumed to have a normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance 
2









= ),  which  measures  the  within-individual  correlation.  If  ρ  is  statistically 
significantly different from 0, we need to use the random-effects model; otherwise, the 
random-effects component is not necessary. To address any possible heterogeneity in the 
error  terms,  we  will  use  the  robust  standard  errors  clustered  at  the  individual  in  our 
estimates. 
We use a linear probability model with individual random effects to estimate equation 
(1).
21 The most interesting coefficients in equation (1) are  kt γ , which are the coefficients 
on the multiple treatment variables  t k Y P *  obtained by interacting the program variables 
and the year variables. These coefficients represent the treatment impacts on enrolment in 
                                                 
21 Strictly speaking, the dependent variable is binary thus it may be more appropriate to use a random-effects 
probit. However, we prefer to use the random effects linear probability model since it will be easier to 
interpret results. In addition, it is also easier to control for robust standard error with this model. Another 
option is to use the child fixed-effects model, but Hausman test results (not shown) indicate no difference 
between  this  model  and  our  random-effects  model.  In  addition,  we  only  have  household  consumption 
aggregrates for one year (2009), which will drop out in the fixed-effects model.   17 
 
each program area for each year after ROSC begins. In other words, these coefficients tell 
us about the impacts of ROSC on enrolment controlling for everything else.  
To provide comparison and as a robustness check on the estimated results, we will use 
three  sequential  models:  the  first  model  includes  only  the  program  and  year  dummy 
variables and the treatment variables, the second model adds to the first model individual 
and  household  characteristics,  and  the  third  model  adds  to  the  second  model  village 
characteristics. If the sizes of the coefficients on the multiple treatment variables  t k Y P *  
remain similar across the different models, this would mean estimation results are robust 
and  not  explained  away  by,  for  example,  the  inclusion  of  household  or  village 
characteristics.  
Since we analyze enrolment rates for the same age cohort over 5 years, 2004 to 2008, 
the age ranges we choose should be kept relevant to the primary school age. Thus we will 
consider three different age cohorts, which are the ages 6- 10, 6- 8, and 7- 14 in 2004. 
These three age cohorts will provide some comparison on the impacts of the projects, but 
these impacts can be different for each age cohort. Since these age cohorts are in 2004, by 
2008—that  is  4  years  later—the  age  cohort  6-  8  would  be  10-  12.  This  cohort  went 
through primary school age during this interval, thus they were most likely to have been 
affected by the project.  
Similarly, the age cohort 7- 14 in 2004 would be the age cohort 11- 18 in 2008, thus 
this age cohort would mostly have been past the primary school age by 2008. Thus in 
terms of age, the age cohort 7- 14 in 2004 was likely to have been less affected by the 
project,  except  perhaps  in  the  beginning  post-ROSC  years.  The  age  cohort  6-  10  in 
2004—which would be the age cohort 10- 14 in 2008—shares some features of the age 18 
 
cohorts 6- 8 and 7- 14, thus we may expect weaker ROSC impacts for this age cohort 
compared to the age cohort 6- 8, and stronger ROSC impacts overall compared to the age 
cohort 7- 14. 
 
Estimation Results 
Table  3  provides  the  estimated  results  using  equation  (1).  Estimation  results  are 
robust, with the sizes of the program impact coefficients  kt γ  being rather similar across 
the different models (for the same age cohorts).  kt γ are highly statistically significant for 
the two age cohorts 6- 10 and 6- 8 but insignificant for the age cohort 7- 14—which is 
expected given our discussion above.
22 Moreover, the impacts of the ROSC projects on 
enrolment for the age cohort 6-8 is largest, to be followed by that for the cohort 6- 10 and 
lastly for the cohort 7- 14. Overall, enrolment rates in GA areas are only (statistically) 
higher than those in non-ROSC areas in 2006, and are lower than enrolment rates in the G 
areas in every year for the two cohorts 6- 8 and 6- 10. The within-individual correlation 
coefficients ρ range from 0.25 to 0.54 and are strongly statistically significant, indicating 
that it is necessary to include the child random-effects component in our model. 
Since  a  linear  probability  model  is  used,  estimates  can  just  be  read  off  of  the 
coefficients. For example, a child in the age cohort 6- 10 residing in the G areas is 12 
percent more likely to be enrolled in school in 2006, but a child in the age cohort 6- 8 
residing in the G areas is 19 percent more likely to be enrolled in school in the same year.   
Other variables have the usually expected impacts on enrolment. Controlling for other 
factors, older children are more likely to be enrolled in school, but age has a nonlinear 
                                                 
22 As a robustness check, we also extend the estimation sample to include year 2009 and estimation results 
(not shown) are very similar. In particular, the G intervention has highly statistically significant impacts for 
this year. 19 
 
impact on enrolment. Children living in wealthier households or households with more 
education levels (as represented by the years of schooling for the most educated household 
member) have higher enrolment probabilities. On the other hand, households with large 
sizes have negative impacts on enrolments, but this relationship should be interpreted as 
correlational  rather  than  causal  because  of  the  well-known  quantity-quality  tradeoff 
between family sizes and children’s education achievement (see, for example, Becker and 
Lewis, 1973). While children living in richer villages are 16 percent more likely to enroll 
in school, this is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level, and other village 
characteristics are not statistically significant in all the regressions.  
Interestingly, girls are around 10 percent more likely to be enrolled in school than 
boys for all the three age cohorts, controlling for other factors. Thus we estimate equation 
(1) separately for girls and boys and show estimation results in Table 4. To save space, 
only the program impact coefficients are shown, and the coefficients for other control 
variables are suppressed.
23  
Consistent with the results in Table 3, ROSC has the strongest impacts on the age 
cohort 6- 8 for both boys and girls, and has stronger impacts on girls than boys. For 
example, for  girls in the age cohort 6- 10, ROSC has strongly statistically significant 
impacts  in  both  the  G  and  GA  areas  in  2006.      However,  the  impacts  appear  to  be 
strongest in earlier years (i.e., 2006) for girls and later years (i.e. 2008) for boys. In 2006, 
the GA intervention also has some impacts on enrolment for girls in the age cohort 7- 14, 
although these impacts are marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Still, where the 
                                                 
23 Perhaps the most interesting result is that the share of villagers having passed Grade 5 or higher is highly 
statistically significant and has positive effects in the regressions for girls but statistically insignificant in the 
regressions for boys.  20 
 
impacts are statistically significant, those in the G areas are consistently stronger than 
those in the GA areas.  
We turn to examine the impacts of the ROSC program on student test scores in the 
next section.  
 
IV.2. Impacts of ROSC Program on Test Scores  
Empirical Model 
Given that the provision of ROSC schools represents a shock to the supply of schools 
in an area, it is natural to investigate the impacts of ROSC by interacting dummy variables 
indicating ROSC areas with the year dummy variables in the previous Section. However, 
a  similar  modeling  approach  for  test  scores  may  not  provide  a  good  estimate  of  the 
impacts of ROSC schools since averaged test scores for all the students in an area can be a 
noisy measurement. Thus in this Section we examine the gains in test scores over time for 
students going to ROSC schools versus those for students attending non-ROSC by directly 
interacting dummy variables indicating ROSC schools with the year dummy variables.  
Since the characteristics of ROSC schools are fundamentally different from those of 
other formal primary schools,
24 we make two important assumptions to investigate the 
impacts of ROSC schools on student test scores  
i.  school choice is not available for most children in Bangladesh, and  
ii.  the differences between ROSC schools and non-ROSC schools can be controlled 
for with the observed school characteristics in our survey. 
Given  the  previous  studies  on  (religious)  school  choice  in  Bangladesh  (see,  for 
example,  Asadullah,  Chaudhury,  and  Dar,  2007),
25  we  acknowledge  that  the  first 
                                                 
24 As discussed in a previous section, ROSC schools have only one teacher and are mostly newly built 
schools.  21 
 
assumption would not be true in practice whenever students (or strictly speaking, their 
parents) can decide whether they go to a ROSC school or a non-ROSC school. In fact, 
from  Table  2,  we  know  that  students  attending  ROSC  schools  generally  have  lower 
academic performance (as measured by standardized test scores) compared to students 
attending non-ROSC schools. When important household characteristics were compared 
between these two types of students, students attending ROSC schools are found to come 
from poorer and less well-educated households (Table 2).  
However, since we do not have any good instruments in the survey to identify which 
students would be selected into which schools, our estimated coefficients on the ROSC 
schools variables (including the interacted terms between these variables and the  year 
dummy variables) would be biased. But fortunately, given the selection of academically 
weaker  students  with  less  advantaged  backgrounds  into  ROSC  schools,  it  is  rather 
straightforward to show that the estimated coefficients on the ROSC schools variables are 
biased downward rather than upward.  
Indeed, assume that student test scores are a function of just the school type students 
attend and student innate ability and can be estimated using the following model 
ε θ γ α + + + = A P T  
where T is student test score, P is the school type (here ROSC schools), A is student 
innate ability, ε is the error term, and all the subscripts are omitted for simplicity. Again 
the impact of ROSC schools on student test scores is measured by the coefficientγ . Note 
that in this model, θ  is assumed to be positive (i.e. students with more ability have higher 
                                                                                                                                                   
25 But note that Asadullah, Chaudhury and Dar (2007) do not find that, conditional on socio-economic 
background, religious school choice at the secondary level results in significant difference in student test 
scores. Another study on religious school choice for Indonesia by Newhouse and Beegle (2006) find similar 
results. 22 
 
test  scores),  and  the  correlation  between  P  and  A  is  negative  or  0 ) , cov( < A P   (i.e. 
academically weaker students are more likely to attend ROSC schools, which are shown 
in Table 2). Since student innate ability is unobserved, and A cannot be included in the 
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A P E + =  Since  , 0 ) var( , 0 ) , cov( > < P A P and 0 > θ , the second term in 
this expression is negative. Thus, our estimate γˆof γ  is biased downward. 
Thus, any estimated impacts of ROSC schools would represent the lower bounds of 
the true impacts. And it is perhaps reasonable to make the second  assumption with a 
number of control variables on school characteristics that we use. 
With some minor changes in notation, we can evaluate the impacts of ROSC schools 
on  student  learning  outcomes  using  a  model  which  is  similar  to,  although  somewhat 
simpler than, equation (1). However, the school (and student) questionnaires are slightly 
different from the household questionnaires, thus the explanatory variables are slightly 
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*      (2) 
where the variables are defined as follows 
α : constant term 
ist T : learning outcomes, as measured by standardized test scores, for child i in school s at 
time t 23 
 
k P : program school, with  k= 1, 2.  1 P being the Grant (G) schools and  2 P  being the 
Grant+ Allowance (GA) schools. The reference category is the non-ROSC schools in non-
ROSC areas (pure control group). 
Y : year dummy variable, which equals 1 for the year 2009 and 0 for the year 2006 
is Z : other control variables including individual, household, and school characteristics 
obtained from the follow-up survey.  
Individual characteristics include student gender and age. Household characteristics 
include parental literacy, household size, and household living standards as measured by a 
housing asset index.
26 School characteristics include the time it takes each student to get to 
school,  the  frequency  of  homework  assignment  in  English  and  Mathematics  for  each 
student, the number of days the school was open in the last two weeks, the condition of 
school classrooms, the condition of classroom blackboards, and school infrastructure such 
as whether the school has a toilet, an alphabetic chart, a number chart, electricity or water.  
The  child  random  effects i µ ,  the  random  error  term ist ε ,  and  the  within-individual 
correlation ρ are defined in a similar way to equation (1).
27 Also similar to equation (1), 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level to address any possible heterogeneity 
in the error terms. 
Again, the most interesting coefficients in equation (2) are k γ , which are the 
coefficients on the treatment variables  Y P k *  obtained by interacting the program school 
                                                 
26 We use a housing asset index since the student questionnaire does not contain a household consumption 
module  which  can  allow  calculation  of  household  expenditures.  This  asset  index  is  the  first  principal 
component of household assets such as television, fan, bicycle, phone, and access to electricity.  
27 Again, estimation results using a student fixed-effects model (not shown) are very similar to the random-
effects model. Hausman tests do not reject the null of no difference between these two models, except for 
math scores. Furthermore, since all the time-invariant variables including student and school characteristics 
will be washed out in the student fixed-effects model, we prefer to use the random-effects model.  24 
 
variables and the year variables. These coefficients represent the treatment impacts on test 
scores in 2009 compared to 2006 for students attending different types of school. In other 
words, these coefficients measure the relative gains in test scores for ROSC schools 
compared to non-ROSC schools in non-ROSC areas (ITT sample) over time. 
 
Estimation Results 
Estimation results are provided in Table 5 for the impacts of ROSC schools (G schools 
and GA schools) on test scores compared to non-ROSC schools. The coefficients on the 
interacted terms between G schools and GA schools and the year dummy variable have 
mixed signs, although they are mostly positive. However, these coefficients are small in 
size and not statistically different from zero across all models. This implies that, both G 
schools and GA schools have similar impacts on the gains in student test scores as non-
ROSC schools. In other words, during 2006- 2009, ROSC schools are performing as well 
as non-ROSC schools in boosting student test scores.
28  
Given the lower starting points in test scores for students attending ROSC schools, 
especially GA schools (Table 2), and that ROSC schools are  much smaller and  more 
recently established than non-ROSC schools, this indicates perhaps no small achievement 
of the ROSC project. In particular, as discussed above, since the true impacts of ROSC 
schools are underestimated, these impacts are just conservative estimates.  
                                                 
28 It is interesting to see that there is not much difference between the impacts of G and GA schools on test 
scores, although G schools have somewhat stronger effects on enrolment as shown in the previous Section. 
We believe this can be explained by two main reasons. First, during the project implementation, G schools 
are also found to provide some allowances to students, thus effectively making them similar to GA schools. 
Second, there is evidence that allowances to students are not efficiently targeted toward the poorest through 
non-optimal project management which can contaminate the original project design. See Sarr et al. (2010) 
for more details and also the next footnote. 25 
 
Other variables, except for student gender, have the expected impacts. Students 
coming from wealthier households and/ or having literate parents have higher test scores. 
The longer students live from school, the more likely they have lower test scores; however 
this is mostly marginally significant at the 10 percent level. While the frequency of math 
homework has no statistically significant impact on test scores, more English homework 
can improve math test scores by 0.2 standard deviations, perhaps suggesting some 
complementary impacts of verbal skills on math skills. School with better blackboards or 
with number charts or with water has positive impacts on both Bangla and math test 
scores. For example, a number chart can increase math scores by as much as 0.2 standard 
deviations. But it is somewhat puzzling that alphabetic charts can somehow reduce student 
math scores.   
It is interesting to note in Table 5 that girls have around 0.1 standard deviations higher 
gains in Bangla test scores than boys. However, girls do not have higher math scores than 
boys. To further investigate these gender differences, we rerun the same regressions in 
Table 5 separately for girls and boys and provide estimation results in Table 6. These 
results show that in general there is no difference in the impacts of ROSC schools on test 
scores for boys or girls, although girls studying at GA schools appear to have higher math 
test scores (which are marginally significant at the 11 percent level). 
 
Robustness Checks 
Tests Taken at School versus at Home 
As discussed in the previous section, around 70 percent of the children with both 
baseline and follow-up test scores took the follow-up test at school, and the remaining 
children took this test at home. It can be argued that the environment under which the test 26 
 
was  taken  can  affect  student  test  scores  in  various  ways  (e.g.  students  may  be  more 
focused at school or lighting conditions may be different between school and home). Thus 
as  robustness  check,  we  drop  all  the  children  that  took  tests  at  home  and  rerun  the 
estimations in Table 5. Estimation results (not shown) indicate no difference from those in 
Table 5, suggesting that our results are robust to the place where the tests were taken.  
 
Student Transfer 
Is it possible that parents may respond to the incentives offered in the ROSC schools 
(e.g. student allowances at GA schools) by withdrawing their children from other schools 
and  enroll  them  in  ROSC  schools?  Our  calculation  shows  that  around  30  percent  of 
children that were enrolled in ROSC schools had been enrolled in some other primary or 
Madrasa schools before. In such cases, this can increase the test scores at ROSC schools 
and bias our estimates upward if these students have better academic ability, and bias our 
estimates downward vice versa. To check on this hypothesis, we drop all the children in 
the  estimation  sample  who  had  been attending non-ROSC schools  before  enrolling in 
ROSC schools and re-run the estimation in Table 5. Estimation results (not shown here), 
however, are not different from the previous results, thus indicate our results are robust to 
including  or  excluding  these  transfer  students  who  had  been  enrolled  in  non-ROSC 
schools prior to attending ROSC schools.  
 
Impact Heterogeneity for Student Ability 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 above, the gains in test scores appear to vary for students 
with different baseline scores, especially in GA schools compared to non-ROSC schools. 27 
 
To further investigate this hypothesis, we divide student performance in the baseline into 
four  quartiles,  interact  the  four  dummy  variables  indicating  these  quartiles  with  the 
treatment variables, and re-run the estimation in Table 5. Estimation results (Table 7) 
show  that,  while  there  is  almost  no  difference  over  time  between  weak  and  average 
students  (quartiles  1  and  2)  in  both  ROSC  and  non-ROSC  schools,  better-performing 
students (quartiles 3 and 4) in the baseline at GA schools indeed improve more compared 
to their peers at non-ROSC schools. These gains range from 0.2- 0.3 standard deviations 
for the combined test scores to 0.3- 0.4 standard deviations for Bangla and math scores. 
These results suggest that GA schools did a better job in raising the test scores for better 
students compared to other schools.  
 
V. Other Program Effects
29  
As shown above, the ROSC program has positive impacts on both enrolment and test 
scores. But do these impacts affect non-ROSC schools in the program areas in any way? 
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29 We also examined directly the hypothesis that the ROSC project may have different impacts on school 
enrolment rates in GA areas versus G areas, as well as test scores at GA schools versus G schools, by 
estimating the following modified version of equation (2)   
ist i is GA GA ist Z   Y P   Y P T ε µ η γ δ β α + + + + + + = *  
where PGA is a dummy variable indicating Grant+Allowance schools and the reference category is the Grant 
schools. Estimation results (not shown here) indicate that the G areas have stronger impacts on raising 
enrolment for the age cohorts 6- 10 and 6- 8 than the GA areas do. However, there is no difference between 
G and GA schools’ impacts on test scores, suggesting that over time, the GA schools have a similar impact 
on student test scores as the G schools. These results stand in in contrast to the oft-cited positive impacts of 
monetary incentives on student attendance and performance in the conditional cash transfer literature (see, 
for example, Fiszbein et al., 2009). While our estimates in fact points to the somewhat stronger impacts on 
enrolment and spillover effects from G schools, we believe this can be influenced by project implementation 
and may not reflect the true impacts of the original design. See also our preceding footnote. 28 
 
The variables are defined as in equation (2) above, except for the change to the variable k P
representing program schools, with k= 1, 2, 3, 4;  1 P being the Grant (G) schools,  2 P  the 
Grant+ Allowance (GA) schools,  3 P  non-ROSC schools in G areas, and  4 P  non-ROSC 
schools  in  GA  areas.  The  reference  category  is  the  non-ROSC  schools  in  non-ROSC 
areas. 
Estimation results (Table 8) show that students attending non-ROSC schools in ROSC 
areas generally improve their test scores more than students attending non-ROSC schools 
in non-ROSC areas, with the improvement ranging from 0.3 standard deviations in math 
scores to 0.53 standard deviations in Bangla scores and combined scores. In particular, 
students attending non-ROSC schools in G areas gain more than those attending non-
ROSC schools in GA areas. The gains for the former group are from twice more than to 
almost three times higher than those for the latter group.  
There are two possible explanations for this difference. First, ROSC schools may have 
done  a  good  job  in  attracting  both  out-of-school  children  and  the  weaker  students  in 
ROSC areas—who would have gone to non-ROSC school in ROSC areas in the absence 
of ROSC schools—thus leaving non-ROSC schools in ROSC areas with better students. 
This hypothesis appears to be consistent with the results in Table 3, where ROSC schools 
are found to significantly raise school enrolment in ROSC areas. Second, the presence of 
ROSC schools, especially G schools, may increase the efficiency for non-ROSC schools 
in ROSC areas, perhaps most likely through increased competition for student enrolment. 
This hypothesis  would  be consistent with  Hoxby  (2000, 2002)’s argument that public 
schools are likely to respond to competition from choice schools (ROSC schools in our 
case) by raising their student achievement. 29 
 
At the same time, there is almost no change to the test scores for student attending 
ROSC schools versus those attending non-ROSC schools in non-ROSC areas, which is 
reassuring and confirms the robustness of the results discussed earlier in Table 5.   
 
VI. Relative Efficiency of ROSC Schools  
ROSC  schools  appear  to  operate  more  efficiently  than  government  primary  (GP) 
schools in several aspects.
 30 First, ROSC schools are organized around a single teacher in 
one classroom, thus they  exhibit low operating costs compared to GP  schools. ROSC 
schools often rent a room in a house to serve as a classroom in which multiple grades are 
being taught by the same teacher.  
Second,  teacher  salaries—which  usually  represent  the  lion’s  share  of  operational 
expenses  for  the  education  sector  in  developing  countries—are  also  much  smaller  in 
ROSC schools. While the average annual government expenditure per student at ROSC 
schools is around Taka 1,489 (Sarr et al., 2010), the corresponding figure for GP schools 
is more than twice higher at Taka 3,108 (GOB, 2009).
31 Furthermore, the majority of 
ROSC teachers (85%) earn a monthly salary less than Taka 1,200 and ROSC teachers’ 
monthly salaries are rarely higher than Taka 1,500 (ROSC Project Office Unit, 2009). 
This monthly salary is more than six times less than the monthly salary of Taka 7,515 for 
the least qualified teachers (who are assistant teachers without a Primary Training Institute 
(PTI) certificate), and the monthly salary of Taka 7,950 for the average teachers with a 
PTI certificate. 
                                                 
30 We do not have data on costs for other non-ROSC schools including Madrasa schools, but the majority 
(95% or more) of non-ROSC schools in our estimation samples are government primary schools.  
31 These numbers are recurrent unit costs and the former figure is for 2009 and the latter for 2008.  30 
 
Notably, while the student-teacher ratio in ROSC schools (35 students per teacher) is 
smaller  than  the  corresponding  figure  (52  students  per teacher)  for GP  schools,
32  this 
difference is still disproportionate to the wide disparity in teacher salaries.  
Third,  compared  to  GP  schools,  the  management  of  ROSC  schools  is  more 
decentralized with Community Management Centers (CMC) working closely with local 
NGOs,
33  thereby  enhancing  the  accountability  in  school  management.  Low  teacher 
absenteeism—less  than  5  percent—is  another  characteristic  of  ROSC  schools  (ROSC 
Monitoring Report 2009). Among teachers present in school during the survey visit, over 
80% were actually teaching. 
At  the  same  time,  students  attending  ROSC  schools  have  equally  substantially 
improved their performance in Bangla and Math tests as well as their peers at non-ROSC 
schools, and academically stronger students at GA schools have even improved more. 
This  relatively  good  performance  of  ROSC  schools  despite  their  low  operating  costs 
seems to suggest that they are more efficient compared to non ROSC schools.
34  
It  may  be  useful  to  reflect  on  the  driving  factors  behind  this  efficiency  at  ROSC 
schools.  Unsurprisingly,  the  advantages  of  ROSC  schools  are  built  upon  the  same 
characteristics of its prototype—the successful BRAC school model. In addition to the 
features discussed earlier (e.g., BRAC schools have smaller class sizes and more contact 
hours), two features that are often missing in GP schools can be highlighted.  
                                                 
32 An obvious implication of this is that ROSC students are more likely to get more attention from their 
teacher than their peers in non-ROSC schools. However, while there is no ROSC (or BRAC) secondary 
school, it should be noted that in the Bangladeshi context, smaller class sizes at the secondary school level 
may not lead to higher test scores (Asadullah, 2005). 
33 These NGOs assist the ROSC school in identifying out-of-school children and hard-to-reach children, 
ensuring their enrolment and attendance, and support CMCs in running the ROSC schools. 
34 In fact, evidence elsewhere shows that other models of non-formal schools in Honduras, Ghana, and Mali 
are also more cost-effective than their public counterparts (DeStefano et al., 2006).  31 
 
First,  BRAC  schools  are  built  and  continuously  improved  upon  the  principle  of 
“listening  to  the  people”  since  BRAC  itself  is  “constantly  soliciting  and  acting  on 
feedback, criticism, and suggestions” (Ahmed and French, 2006). This spirit results in the 
dynamism and flexibility behind the BRAC school model, which has now been adopted in 
a  number  of  countries  in  Africa  and  Asia  including  Afghanistan,  Liberia,  Pakistan, 
Tanzania,  Southern  Sudan,  and  Sri  Lanka.  In  fact,  the  non-formal  primary  education 
program is just an area among several others such as silk worms, microfinance, solar 
panels,  maternal  health,  recycled  paper,  and  high  fashion  in  which  BRAC  operates 
projects  based  on  a  social  entrepreneurship  approach  (BRAC,  2009).  ROSC  schools 
understandably inherit this dynamism through a highly decentralized system with strong 
community participation in management. 
Second, the quality of teachers at BRAC schools is perceived to be higher than that of 
their GP counterparts in several ways.
35 Firstly, BRAC teachers are recruited from the 
same local community as their students and have a close relationship with their students, 
who they are responsible for during the full three-year (or four- year) cycles. In contrast to 
GP teachers who may either neglect or resort to corporal punishment for their students, 
BRAC teachers are  affectionate to their students (Chabbot, 2006). Secondly,  although 
BRAC teachers’ formal education levels are often limited to high-school level (i.e., nine 
or ten years of schooling) and lower than those of GP teachers, their skills are constantly 
developed through needs-based and practical refresher training which occurs monthly.
36 In 
                                                 
35  While  raising  a  number  of  issues  about  the  effectiveness  of  school  resources,  Hanushek  strongly 
advocates the role of teacher quality in raising educational outcomes. See, for example, Hanushek (2011) 
and Hanushek and Rivkin (2006). 
36 It is interesting to note that recent evidence for the US suggests that neither holding a college major in 
education nor more advanced degree is associated with elementary and middle school teaching effectiveness 
(Chingos and Peterson, 2011). 32 
 
addition, BRAC teachers also have much stronger support and supervision than their GP 
counterparts (Haiplik, 2004). And thirdly, BRAC teachers are highly motivated, perhaps 
not least because of the enhanced respect and standing in their communities obtained by 
their teaching status.    
 
VII. Conclusion  
In  this  paper  we  investigate  the  impacts  of  ROSC  schools  versus  other  types  of 
schools on student enrolment and test score gains over time. This is a unique program 
where the GOB for the first time experimented with bringing into the public system the 
well-known  NGO-run  BRAC  school  model.  We  found  that  ROSC  schools  increase 
enrolment  probability  between  9  and  18  percent  and  perform  as  well  as  non-ROSC 
schools  in  raising  test  scores.  In  particular,  better  performing  students  attending  GA 
schools improve their test scores by around 0.2- 0.4 standard deviations compared to other 
schools.  
Furthermore, ROSC schools appear to have positive externalities on test scores for 
students  attending  non-ROSC  schools  in  program  areas.  These  findings  are  robust  to 
different  model  assumptions  and  specifications.  Given  the  selection  of  academically 
weaker students coming from less advantaged households into ROSC schools, we also 
show  that  our  estimated  impacts  are  conservative  (i.e.,  biased  downward).  Notably, 
despite this impressive performance ROSC schools, among other things, have much lower 
operational costs than GP schools.  
Given mixed results about the effects of different components of school resources, 
these results about the positive impacts of ROSC schools appear quite encouraging. While 
future  research  may  focus  on  disentangling  and  quantifying  further  the  particular 33 
 
characteristics that make ROSC (or BRAC) schools stand out from other school models, 
our results point to the effectiveness of this non-formal school model as a comprehensive 
“package”,  whose  salient  characteristics  include  streamlined  operations,  high  teacher 
quality, and a spirit of constant self-learning and self-improving.      
Both the effectiveness and efficiency of the ROSC school program render it as an 
attractive  approach  to  increase  schooling  quantity  and  quality,  especially  as  the  GOB 
plans to achieve the MDG goals of universal primary education by 2015.  Our results 
suggest that the ROSC program can be expanded on a larger scale in Bangladesh. We also 
believe that these findings provide useful input for policy makers in Bangladesh and other 
countries that may plan to adopt a similar schooling model.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Children Age 6- 14 in 2004 in the Panel Household 
Survey by Program and Non-Program Areas, Bangladesh 2006 




Enrolled in school in 2004 0.87 0.85 -0.01 0.85 -0.02
(0.34) (0.35) (0.36)
Age  11.31 11.02 -0.29 11.06 -0.25
(2.23) (2.34) (2.23)
Female 0.47 0.47 -0.00 0.50 0.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
HH's most edu. member's yrs of schooling 6.62 6.12 -0.50* 5.73 -0.89**
(2.97) (3.38) (3.12)
Household size 5.12 4.91 -0.21 5.12 0.00
(1.51) (1.45) (1.33)
Log of per capita monthly exp. 7.25 7.16 -0.09** 7.13 -0.12**
(0.45) (0.40) (0.43)
Share of village households w. electricity 0.39 0.45 0.06** 0.41 0.01
(0.30) (0.23) (0.24)
Average cultivable land area 58.68 101.54 42.86** 53.78 -4.90**
(18.81) (41.35) (29.54)
Share of cultivable land area under irriagation in 
winter
0.37 0.47 0.10** 0.38 0.02
(0.12) (0.18) (0.17)
Share of village hhs that consumed/ purchased fish or 
meat in past 7 days
0.84 0.81 -0.03** 0.81 -0.02*
(0.20) (0.10) (0.14)
Share of villagers passing Grade 5 or higher 0.39 0.33 -0.05** 0.31 -0.07**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
No of children 219 302 420
Note: 1. Standard deviations in parentheses; *p< .1, **p<0.05. 
2. Significance levels are for two-tailed t tests between G or GA areas and non-ROSC areas.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Children with Test Scores by Program and Non-




Mean (Sd) Mean (Sd) Dif. Mean (Sd) Dif.
Bangla Scores in 2006 (percent) 55.94 52.92 -3.02 33.27 -22.67**
(33.28) (36.42) (37.10)
Math Scores in 2006 (percent) 55.30 54.56 -0.74 43.54 -11.76**
(32.69) (34.34) (39.03)
Combined Scores in 2006 (percent) 55.70 53.53 -2.17 37.12 -18.58**
(27.34) (30.04) (33.63)
Age 10.87 11.67 0.80* 11.57 0.70
(6.07) (3.51) (5.78)
Female 0.53 0.45 -0.08** 0.49 -0.04
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Household asset index 0.60 0.17 -0.43** -0.46 -1.06**
(1.66) (1.71) (1.39)
Literate parent(s) 0.70 0.51 -0.19** 0.53 -0.17**
(0.46) (0.50) (0.50)
Female head 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.01
(0.30) (0.28) (0.28)
Household size 4.89 4.82 -0.07 5.09 0.2
(1.51) (1.43) (2.13)
Time to school 12.79 7.74 -5.05** 6.21 -6.58**
(10.07) (6.53) (6.24)
English homework most of the week 0.97 0.92 -0.05** 0.76 -0.21**
(0.16) (0.27) (0.43)
Math homework most of the week 0.96 0.95 -0.01 0.77 -0.19**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.42)
No of days school open last 2 weeks 11.08 11.33 0.25** 10.03 -1.05**
(1.43) (1.81) (2.36)
Condition of blackboard  3.00 2.87 -0.13** 2.78 -0.22**
(0.00) (0.44) (0.64)
School has toilet 0.93 0.54 -0.39** 0.32 -0.61**
(0.25) (0.50) (0.47)
School has alphabetic chart 0.54 0.34 -0.2** 0.27 -0.27**
(0.50) (0.47) (0.45)
School has number chart 0.54 0.15 -0.39** 0.19 -0.35**
(0.50) (0.36) (0.39)
School has electricity 0.67 0.10 -0.57** 0.12 -0.55**
(0.47) (0.30) (0.32)
School has water 0.94 0.76 -0.18** 0.41 -0.53**
(0.24) (0.43) (0.49)
No of children 217 833 782
Note: 1. Standard deviations in parentheses. The differences are between program schools and control schools.
2. Significance levels are for two-tailed t tests with unequal variances between G or GA schools and 
non-ROSC schools; *p< .1, **p<0.05.
3. Except for the test scores, all characteristics were in 2009.




Table 3: Impacts of ROSC Project on School Enrolment,  Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
G areas* 2006 0.117*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.188*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.012 0.016 0.016
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
GA areas* 2006 0.089** 0.092** 0.092** 0.118** 0.121** 0.121** 0.042 0.044 0.044
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
G areas* 2007 0.071 0.075 0.074 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.161*** -0.031 -0.023 -0.024
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
GA areas* 2007 0.021 0.026 0.017 0.089 0.089 0.076 -0.019 -0.018 -0.024
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
G areas* 2008 0.117** 0.120** 0.120** 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.175*** 0.020 0.028 0.027
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
GA areas* 2008 0.013 0.018 0.010 0.060 0.060 0.047 -0.025 -0.024 -0.030
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
G areas -0.145*** -0.128*** -0.118** -0.215*** -0.194*** -0.189*** -0.042 -0.021 0.013
(0.045) (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.055) (0.062) (0.035) (0.034) (0.041)
GA areas -0.098** -0.077** -0.061 -0.112** -0.097* -0.073 -0.067** -0.034 -0.016
(0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.053) (0.050) (0.054) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Year 2006 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.130*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Year 2007 0.077** 0.057 0.054 0.122*** 0.111** 0.112** -0.059** -0.093*** -0.100***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Year 2008 0.008 -0.012 -0.015 0.081* 0.069 0.070 -0.142*** -0.176*** -0.183***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Age  0.324*** 0.324*** 0.565 0.639 0.087 0.084
(0.107) (0.108) (0.421) (0.432) (0.069) (0.069)
Age squared -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.030 -0.034 -0.006** -0.006**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003)
Female 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
HH's most edu. member's yrs of 
schooling
0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Household size -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log of per capita monthly exp. 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.079** 0.120*** 0.115***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029)




Average cultivable land area 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of cultivable land area 
under irriagation in winter
0.036 -0.002 0.056
(0.071) (0.081) (0.075)
Share of village hhs that 
consumed/ purchased fish or 
meat in past 7 days
0.157* 0.133 0.159*
(0.084) (0.098) (0.084)




Constant 0.841*** -1.394** -1.550*** 0.805*** -2.429 -2.945 0.862*** -0.330 -0.453
(0.031) (0.561) (0.565) (0.042) (1.890) (1.953) (0.025) (0.456) (0.457)
R2 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.22
ρ 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.44***
No of children 661 661 661 440 440 440 799 799 799
Total no of obs.  2620 2620 2620 1748 1748 1748 3164 3164 3164
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 




Table 4: Impacts of ROSC Project on School Enrolment for Boys and Girls,  Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
A. Boys
G areas* 2006 0.078 0.083 0.083 0.154* 0.157* 0.157* 0.008 0.011 0.011
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
GA areas* 2006 0.068 0.071 0.070 0.083 0.086 0.086 0.015 0.017 0.017
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
G areas* 2007 0.054 0.065 0.075 0.163* 0.166* 0.172* -0.030 -0.018 -0.016
(0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
GA areas* 2007 0.005 0.014 0.011 0.069 0.070 0.057 -0.039 -0.037 -0.035
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054)
G areas* 2008 0.136* 0.148* 0.157** 0.207** 0.209** 0.215** 0.043 0.055 0.057
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
GA areas* 2008 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.026 0.027 0.014 -0.030 -0.029 -0.026




N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.20
ρ 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.54***
No of children 334 334 334 219 219 219 424 424 424
Total no of obs.  1326 1326 1326 873 873 873 1677 1677 1677
B. Girls
G areas* 2006 0.160*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.237*** 0.019 0.023 0.024
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
GA areas* 2006 0.114** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.071* 0.075* 0.075*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
G areas* 2007 0.091 0.093 0.087 0.162* 0.160* 0.154* -0.031 -0.025 -0.026
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
GA areas* 2007 0.030 0.034 0.024 0.096 0.095 0.084 0.004 0.005 -0.009
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
G areas* 2008 0.095 0.097 0.091 0.143 0.140 0.135 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
GA areas* 2008 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.073 0.072 0.061 -0.020 -0.019 -0.032




N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.23
ρ 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.41*** 0.28*** 0.28***
No of children 327 327 327 221 221 221 375 375 375
Total no of obs.  1294 1294 1294 875 875 875 1487 1487 1487
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 
3. The control variables for the regressions are the same as those in Table 3.





Table 5: Impacts of ROSC Schools on Test Scores Compared to Non-ROSC Schools, Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
G schools* 2009 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
GA schools* 2009 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
G schools -0.082 -0.078 0.027 -0.020 -0.026 0.035 -0.066 -0.063 0.038
(0.070) (0.071) (0.075) (0.067) (0.069) (0.075) (0.065) (0.067) (0.071)
GA schools -0.612*** -0.605*** -0.459*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.189** -0.565*** -0.556*** -0.393***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.081) (0.070) (0.073) (0.081) (0.067) (0.071) (0.078)
Year 2009 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.423*** 0.423*** 0.423*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 0.526***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Age 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Female 0.095*** 0.096*** -0.025 -0.024 0.055* 0.056*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Household asset index 0.024** 0.026** 0.016 0.021** 0.025** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Literate parent(s) 0.063* 0.054 0.058* 0.055* 0.077** 0.070**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Female head -0.101* -0.081 -0.058 -0.042 -0.092* -0.070
(0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.051)
Household size -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Time to school -0.004** -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.005** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
English homework most of the week 0.068 0.136** 0.100
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Math homework most of the week -0.021 -0.079 -0.038
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066)
No of days school open last 2 weeks -0.006 0.006 -0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Condition of blackboard  0.227*** 0.147*** 0.227***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
School has toilet 0.002 -0.063* -0.017
(0.038) (0.035) (0.036)
School has alphabetic chart -0.058 -0.167*** -0.116***
(0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
School has number chart 0.159*** 0.202*** 0.195***
(0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
School has electricity -0.002 -0.033 -0.016
(0.048) (0.046) (0.045)
School has water 0.087** 0.184*** 0.145***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Constant 0.432*** 0.365*** -0.473*** 0.282*** 0.284*** -0.429** 0.425*** 0.370*** -0.561***
(0.061) (0.096) (0.176) (0.059) (0.096) (0.186) (0.056) (0.095) (0.176)
R2 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.19
ρ 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.22***
No of children 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
Total no of obs.  3659 3659 3659 3624 3624 3624 3661 3661 3661
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 




Table 6 :Impacts of ROSC Schools on Test Scores for Boys and Girls, Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
A. Boys
G schools* 2009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.113 -0.113 -0.114 -0.071 -0.071 -0.071
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
GA schools* 2009 0.135 0.135 0.136 -0.088 -0.088 -0.091 0.036 0.036 0.036




N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.20 0.23
ρ 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.19***
No of children 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 965
Total no of obs.  1926 1926 1926 1910 1910 1910 1928 1928 1928
B. Girls
G schools* 2009 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.046 0.046 0.046
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
GA schools* 2009 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.194 0.194 0.193 0.067 0.067 0.067




N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.17
ρ 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.23***
No of children 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867
Total no of obs.  1733 1733 1733 1714 1714 1714 1733 1733 1733
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 
3. The control variables for the regressions are the same as those in Table 5.





   
Table 7: Robustness Checks on Impacts of ROSC Schools on Test Scores, Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Quartile 1* G schools* 2009 -0.083 -0.072 -0.074 -0.041 -0.038 -0.036 -0.165* -0.154 -0.158*
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094)
Quartile 2* G schools* 2009 -0.004 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.012 -0.005 0.023 0.029 0.010
(0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Quartile 3* G schools* 2009 0.029 0.026 0.022 0.041 0.038 0.046 0.025 0.021 0.023
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Quartile 4* G schools* 2009 0.075 0.062 0.073 -0.003 -0.007 0.008 0.025 0.019 0.037
(0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Quartile 1* GA schools* 2009 -0.041 -0.041 -0.028 -0.043 -0.040 -0.013 -0.075 -0.075 -0.056
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Quartile 2* GA schools* 2009 0.034 0.034 0.063 0.049 0.042 0.055 0.010 0.006 0.012
(0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.087) (0.087) (0.085)
Quartile 3* GA schools* 2009 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.280*** 0.068 0.066 0.042 0.279*** 0.272*** 0.243***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091)
Quartile 4* GA schools* 2009 0.127 0.127 0.100 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.306*** 0.184** 0.198** 0.179*
(0.108) (0.107) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Control variables
Individual & households N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.20
ρ 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07***
No of children 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
Total no of obs.  3659 3659 3659 3624 3624 3624 3661 3661 3661
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 
3. The control variables for the regressions are the same as those in Table 5.





   
Table 8: Impacts of Other School Types on Test Scores, Bangladesh 2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
G schools* 2009 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
GA schools* 2009 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Non-ROSC 
schools in G 
areas* 2009
0.529*** 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.341*** 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.516***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Non-ROSC 
schools in GA 
areas* 2009
0.228** 0.228** 0.228** 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.166* 0.166* 0.166*




N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Schools N N Y N N Y N N Y
R2 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.20
ρ 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.22***
No of children 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306 2306
Total no of obs.  4607 4607 4607 4563 4563 4563 4609 4609 4609
Note: 1. *p< .1, **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01;  robust standard errors in parentheses accounts for clustering at the child level.
2. All regressions control for child random effects. 
3. The control variables for the regressions are the same as those in Table 5.




Appendix 1: Comparison of ROSC,  BRAC, and GP Schools
ROSC BRAC GPS
Low teacher absenteism Low teacher absenteism High teacher absenteism
Multigrade  Multigrade Single grade
No school fees  No school fees School fees
Strong community involvement Strong community involvement (Varies)
One teacher One teacher More than one teachers (3- 5 in 
rural schools)
Teacher follows students to end of 
cycle
Teacher follows students to end of 
cycle
Different teacher for each grade
Most teachers recruited from local 
community
Most teachers recruited from local 
community
(Varies)
One classroom school One classroom school Multi-classroom school
Medium/ Small class size (35 or 
less)
Small class size (30 or less) Large class size (33 or more)
Own textbooks Own texbooks (Grade 1-3) Own textbooks
No life skill in curriculum Life skills included in curriculum No life skill in curriculum
Classroom is child-centered Classroom is child-centered Classroom is NOT child-centered
Curriculum
Infrastructure
Teacher
Organization/ 
Management